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Demand for Take-Over of the Whole Acquis by the Accession 
Countries – an Impediment for Membership?* 
 









 According to Copenhagen criteria from 1993, EU defined the take-over of the 
complete body of common EU legislation (so called acquis communautaire) as 
one of the requirements for EU membership – together with democracy, protec-
tion of human rights, market economy and external security. While the accession 
countries have mostly achieved other prerequisites of becoming an EU member, 
the implementation of the acquis remains a difficult and contested issue and is 
hence an impediment for membership. The author investigates the corresponding 
position of interests for both the old EU members and the candidates concerning 
the acquis. The author concludes that the EU enlargement will not fail due to the 
opposition of the old members, since the potential enlargement losers will be 
compensated for. In the accession countries, however, the fulfilment of member-
ship requirements must be democratically legitimised: therefore it needs support 
both from EU and candidate country governments. 
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 The European Union’s (EU) demand to the admission candidates, to take-over the 
common body of legislation, the acquis communautaire, is surely an impediment for 
admission. Without that demand the preparations for admission would have been com-
pleted faster, but the admission negotiations not necessarily easier, as in that case the 
regulation facts, which are now defined by the acquis, would have to be determined in 
another way. Admission requires, however, in any case an equalization of interests be-
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tween the EU and their member states on one hand and the accession countries on the 
other hand.1 
 The different interests though go far beyond the acqui. Very early the EU adopted 
already at the EU summit of Copenhagen in 1993 a list of criteria, which the candidates 
have to fulfil, in order to be able to become a member. That list includes apart from the 
take-over of the acquis further far-reaching demands like those for democracy, consti-
tutional state, respect of human rights, market economy, competitiveness, and non-im-
pairment of the integration process. Two years later, the Copenhagen list was extended 
in Madrid by the demand, according to which the accession countries had to provide for 
sufficient administration and justice capacity in order to incorporate the acqui. These 
demands go in some points beyond the conditions, which are foreseen by the treaties to 
the present member states, both in letters and in interpretation. The EU is verifying the 
observance of conditions and the approach of the candidates on how they perform them 
within the framework of their annual progress reports. 
 So it happened that the EU stopped the accession process of Slovakia for years, as 
they accused the Mečiar Government of using undemocratic practice. And in fact, a 
number of measures and activities of that government did not meet Western concep-
tions, but they merely violated in clear and provable form the letters of international 
treaties. That applies especially to his policy towards the Hungarian minority. Minority 
policy is generally an important part of the critical EU demands, although traditionally 
they are of almost no importance within the EU. The conflicts that do exist within the 
EU (for example Northern Ireland, Basques, Corsicans) were hardly an object of diplo-
matic initiatives by other member states or even the community itself. It can also hardly 
be imagined that the member states in question would have tolerated such interference, 
as the example shows of the failed anti-Haider-policy towards Austria. Other examples 
for such cases where double standards are being applied can be found: for years, the EU 
had criticized Romania for the conditions in the orphans’ homes. Also the criticisms 
uttered by some member states at border-near nuclear power stations (for example Te-
melin in the Czech Republic) is not covered by EU-law, but emerges from the – maybe 
justified – concern about security. The referendum that was organized in Austria in 
January 2002 rose interesting questions in that field concerning democracy and integra-
tion- policy in the way that it binds Austria’s approval to the Czech membership to the 
shutdown of the power plant. Another critical problem is the membership of Cyprus, of 
which Greece is threatening that they will give their approval by making it conditional 
on further enlargements. Here are among others candidates affected, who almost have 
no influence on the fulfilment of the conditions, that is an acceptable settlement between 
the two partial entities of the island. 
 Insofar, the take-over of the acquis is only one of many possible impediments for 
membership and maybe not even the most important one. Nevertheless, the take-over of 
the acquis represents for both parts a central element in the accession process. In the 
following text, we will in more detail investigate the corresponding position of interest 
for both the old members and the candidates concerning the acquis. 
 
1 Cf. Lippert  2000. In this publication there are also two contributions by the author. 
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 View of Present EU Members2 
 The acquis itself is the product of a decade-long equalization of interests among the 
present member states and in fact also the product of former enlargements and the 
equalization of interests of old and new member states achieved by that. The most im-
portant Community policies represent such compromises. The Common Agricultural 
Policy and the Customs Union for industrial goods represented an equalization of 
French agricultural interests and German industrial interests, which formed the eco-
nomic core of the Community foundation. With the enlargements of the Community the 
regional and structural policy gained importance, to equalize the growing differences in 
income and structure. For the member states of today the safeguarding of these parts of 
the acquis is an important condition for the enlargement.  
 Thereby the extension of the existing policies on the new members is jeopardizing 
also the old compromises, as it potentially implies burdens and redistribution to a sensi-
tive extent. So the extension of Agricultural Policy on the countries with big agrarian 
sectors and low income is costly, although a matter that can be financed. Likewise an 
extension of the regional policy in its present form will not only burden the EU-budget 
but also bring about a considerable redistribution of means between the poorer old 
member and the still poorer accession countries. The old members who could not ar-
range in Berlin – when adopting the agenda 2000 at the EU-summit of Berlin in 1999 – 
for a far-reaching reform of the Agricultural and structural policy, postponed that need 
for reform into the accession negotiations and the advanced negotiations, whose result, 
however, the candidates would have to accept. 
 But even here it is not improbable that they use double standards. The EU intends to 
fix, in the field of structural and regional policy, for new members an upper limit of 4 % 
of the national income of the recipient country. On the other hand, other poorer member 
states received in some periods higher percentages, although they were relatively richer 
than the present candidates. In a similar way, in agricultural policy the EU is trying to 
avoid direct payments to the farmers of the new members – with the likely reasons that 
they would not have to be compensated for decreases in the price subsidies, of which 
they never benefited before. It remains to be seen on which compromise the EU and the 
candidates will agree here. It is natural though that every reform in structural and agri-
cultural policy triggers also a conflict among the old members, who are differently af-
fected as net payers or receivers. The coalitions and majorities arising thereby depend 
especially on the shaping of the reform, like the threshold for regional aid (percentage 
of EU average income below which countries are eligible for  transfer claims) or the 
form of aid (transition from regional to national principle, whereby the aid for poorer 
regions in rich countries is left with the rich countries themselves, without any EU 
transfers). The acquis and its concrete formation, therefore, cannot be separated from 
the accession process. 
 The legislation that regulates the internal market and the four basic liberties (free 
movement of goods, services, persons and capital) has to be evaluated in a more differ-
entiated way. Here the distribution effects among the present members and between the 
 
2 The following statements are a broader version of an earlier article by the author (Dauderstädt 2000). 
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old and new members (finally also among the new members) turn out to be more com-
plex. The market integration is – to a different extent – of advantage and disadvantage 
respectively, for the different social groups (work and capital), economic fields and re-
gions. Essentially it will be Germany and – to a lower extent – Austria and Italy that 
will benefit of more economic exchange. At the same time, however, in these countries 
the groups negatively affected by the competitors are also most burdened (for example 
low qualified work force in the construction sector, in the catering industry and in agri-
culture, especially in border-near regions). Investors, exporters and importers are inter-
ested in improved legal security and risk elimination but also in the cutting down of 
competition distortions, which brings about the take-over of EU laws in accession 
countries. 
 The following table 1 shows some important advantages and disadvantages of 
enlargement effects which are to be expected in the member states and the EU as a su-
pranational organization respectively.  
 
Table 1: Expected Advantages and Disadvantages of the Enlargement for the EU and 
their Member States  
Fields of action Advantages Disadvantages 
Trade liberalization Development and providing for 
export markets 
Import competition 




on the whole 
Higher overall competitiveness Production relocation 
Freedom of 
movement 





Additional exports thanks to 
higher demand in Central and 
Eastern Europe (for example 
counselling, supply) 
Budget costs (transfer 
payments), lower transfers 
to previous receivers 
EU as supranational 
actor 
More international weight Higher diversity of interests, 
more complicated decision 
procedures, lower ability to 
act 
 
 The said advantages and disadvantages naturally affect mostly different social 
groups and member states respectively. The corresponding interest and distribution 
problems have to be solved both nationally and within the EU. Even without a deeper 
analysis of the interests on the side of the old members, it becomes clear that the role of 
the acquis is conflicting. Its take-over by the accession states on one hand can not be re-
nounced for the old members and the EU as supranational organization, on the other 
hand it also burdens in single points the member states, and that’s why they aim at real-
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izing exemption provisions in fields they consider problematic, like for example Ger-
many or Austria in the free movement of employees. 
 
 View of the Accession Countries 
 During the change of the system, the transformation countries early fixated on the 
EU-membership. Especially for the anticommunist opposition elite a EU-membership 
seemed to offer the best international hedge of their three goals: democracy, market 
economy and return to Europe. Also public opinion polls in general showed up to 1996 
high rates of approve of more than 80 %, whereby the ideas concerning the EU were 
mostly vague or wrong. As the membership preparations advanced, public consent de-
creased and the awareness of future problems increased. Many goals were achieved, 
which were aspired with the membership, while the take-over of the acquis involves 
also considerable costs. 
 Some of the goals, which were important ten years ago, today seem already 
achieved to a large extent: 
• External security is hardly threatened and at least the NATO-members Poland, 
Czech Republic and Hungary cannot expect better protection from a membership in 
the EU.  
• Democracy is in most countries – despite massive social crisis – astonishingly sta-
ble. It is also more a condition for a EU-membership (Copenhagen criteria) than its 
consequence. In some respect an EU-membership restrains also democracy or ex-
poses it to new risks. Many decisions that now underlie national democratic control 
are made after the membership in Brussels, which shows a notorious “democracy 
deficit”. The membership may polarize also the political forces and provoke a coali-
tion of membership opponents of different kidneys (transformation losers, anti-
Western and authoritarian forces, nationalists, market sceptics). 
• Also the transition to market economy is mostly completed thanks to liberalization 
and privatisation. It is also part of the conditions set forth at Copenhagen and would 
not be a result of the membership. In the field of regulation policy the take-over of 
the acquis communautaire now rather deals with a certain moulding of market econ-
omy in the form of an overwhelming regulations’ density both in quantity and qual-
ity.  
• Economic integration has already far advanced. In foreign trade of the candidates, 
the shares of the EU are with more than 60 % on the level that can be expected in 
view of size and proximity of the involved national economies. The “return to 
Europe” has already been reached in economy. 
 That immense transformation performance of the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe has, however, in many points so far failed to meet its most important goal, 
which is to achieve a higher prosperity for the population of these countries. For with 
both the departure from planned economy and the EU-membership, the people were 
first of all interested in more prosperity, and to approximate their standards of living to 
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the standards of Western Europe. Already the experience with the transition to market 
economy and the opening of foreign trade were rather traumatic for the countries: Deep 
slumps in growth and employment, more poverty and inequality as well as a place in the 
international division of labour, which is now defined by low wages and cheap local re-
sources (not like before 1989 in the role of sellers of medium level technology and 
highly qualified labour in the Eastern bloc). Correspondingly bad is the opinion of many 
people in Central and Eastern Europe about market economy in general – which none-
theless often does not impede them to be in favour of EU-membership. 
 Thus, the change of rules and property situations in the course of transformation 
brought about only partly the wished results. The differences between the countries are 
considerable in that context. Poland and Slovenia are the only two countries that ex-
ceeded in 1998 the national income of 1989. Hungary is – thanks to early reforms and 
massive foreign direct investments – the only country whose export structure has started 
a clear change to products of higher value (especially of machinery). 
 The specific problem for the accession countries of Central- and Eastern Europe is 
their relative low development in comparison to Western Europe. They need a long 
phase of growth above the average, in order to catch up. It would, especially in the in-
terest of political stability, be desirable if impoverishment and growing inequality is in-
hibited and possibly make undone. “Prosperity for all” is the best guarantee for democ-
racy, peace and stability in Central and Eastern Europe and should therefore also be the 
goal of the EU. But is membership and a quick take-over of the acquis the best way to 
that and how should the accession process be arranged, in order to meet its main pur-
pose? 
 Growth development of other poor countries, which joined the EU, shows no defi-
nite pattern: Portugal that acceded in 1986, is a relative story of success, Greece (mem-
bership in 1980) is a deterring example. Ireland (membership in 1972) has for only ten 
years been the economic wonderland of the EU with 5 % growth, but considerable dis-
tribution problems. If one measures the Irish growth not as usual against the gross do-
mestic product but the gross social product3, then it is still one of the poorest countries 
of the EU. Nobody knows whether the image without EU-membership would have been 
better or worse. The first post-communist “Eastern enlargement” by the former German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) lead – true under special conditions like an over-valuated 
currency – to an almost total economic collapse and permanent dependence on transfers. 
This special form of the “Dutch disease” threatens also Central and Eastern Europe after 





3 Hereby the income produced by foreigners in Ireland, especially foreign investors, is deducted and the 
income gained by the Irish abroad added. 
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Table 2: Probable Advantages and Disadvantages of EU-membership for Accession 
Countries 
Fields of action Advantages Disadvantages 
Transfer payments 
of EU 
Additional budget receipts, 
higher import capacities 
Currency appreciation, burden of national 
households by co-financing, high costs due 
to take-over of aquis (for example 
environment, Schengen) 
Free flow of 
capital  
More direct investments, 
growth of productivity through 
modernization of investment 
stocks, infrastructure, 
education etc. with the help of 
EU and direct investments 
Currency appreciation, competition for 
domestic suppliers 
 More portfolio investments, 
higher import capacity 
Currency appreciation, “selling out” of 
domestic property, increase of property 




Secured market access to EU Competition for domestic suppliers, 
adoption of internal market rules burdens 
Central and Eastern European companies 
and benefits suppliers from former EU, price 
increase of merchantable goods (food!), 
therefore pressure on real income, 




Jobs in EU-countries, foreign 
exchange earnings by guest 
workers’ remittances 




Recovery in EU border regions Segregation against East, problems in border 
regions, aggravation of regional disparities 
Economic policy Lower risk of indebtedness, 
balance of payments’ and fiscal 
crisis (like in Hungary and 
Czech Republic 1995/96), ob-
ligation to pursue solid 
monetary and fiscal policy 
Loss of monetary, fiscal, trade and structural 
policy governing capacities, stability bias of 
monetary policy, in case of Estonia’s  




Influence on arrangement of 
EU policies 
Loss of sovereignty, especially for small 
countries relatively minor influence despite 
institutional reform of EU 
 
 Obviously it is each national policy that decides on how the new member develops. 
Membership in the EU as such is no success guarantee for growth. In international 
comparison, the EU is rather characterized by unemployment above average than espe-
cially quick growth. Also the reducing of income disparities between rich and poor re-
gions of the EU is remaining in tight bounds. In a monetary union, this equalization is 
only possible through an “inflating” of incomes (Balassa-Samuelson-effect) in the 
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catching-up regions/countries, which the EU economic policy would have to tolerate, 
but it does this only reluctantly. From the viewpoint of some observers it would be pref-
erable to unilaterally take-over the Euro without membership in the monetary union 
with its stability policy strait jacket.4 All in all the development of the accession coun-
tries depends on the fact, how they use the advantages of EU-membership, without suc-
cumbing to their risks and side effects. Special attention has to be paid to the political 
dangers of redistribution effects, which are attributed to foreign forces. 
 If one compares the advantages and disadvantages of EU-membership in analogue 
with the member states (table 1), then there results a similarly differentiated picture as is 
shown in table 2. 
• No demands in the field of science and research, education and schooling, small and 
medium-sized companies, common foreign and security policy, statistics and finan-
cial control; 
• Few demands in the fields of culture and audio-visual communication, industrial 
policy, fishery (existing treaties, aids, preservation of species), economic and 
monetary union (Article 109k), judiciary and internal affairs (Schengen), structural 
policy and free movement of persons (costs of medical care, recognition of exams); 
• Transitional periods in the field of telecommunication (public telephone nets, cable 
TV etc.), enterprise law (patents), free flow of goods (medicine), consumer protec-
tion (national regulations on product liability are more severe), foreign trade rela-
tionship (existing free trade zones and customs unions, bilateral market protection), 
agriculture (abundance of rules and standards), customs union (maintenance of low 
customs towards the neighbors), competition policy (subsidies), social policy (job 
security, content of tar in cigarettes), energy (among others stock supplies in crude 
oil), transport (access for EU flight lines, liberalization of freight transport, truck 
weight, liberalization of transport by water, tachograph, cabotage etc.), movement of 
capital (sale of real estate, pensions funds, etc.), environment (municipal waste wa-
ter, drinking water directive, package, ground water protection etc.), free flow of 
services (demand for own capital, protection of investors, regulation of banks, pro-
tection of depositors), taxation (value added tax rates, taxation of regular companies 
and subsidiary companies, taxes on alcohol and tobacco, etc.). 
 Most demands indicate that there are fears concerning high costs and / or competi-
tive disadvantages. In single cases it is about cultural concerns. 
 
 Prospects 
 The acquis would turn out to be a real impediment for membership, if the accession 
failed due to the question of its take-over. The above elaborated interest conflicts give 
some rise to such fears, as there do exist considerable groups of enlargement losers on 
the side of the old members and of accession losers respectively on the side of the can-
didates. 
 
4 That is about the proposition of Andrzej Bratkowski and Jacek Rostowski (2001). 
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 Whether and how strong these groups can enforce their claims, depends on one hand 
on the national and European compensation and equalization policies. On the other 
hand, the different groups have different abilities to enforce their demands in the na-
tional political systems and the EU policy on the whole – either directly by influence on 
EU institutions (Parliament, Commission) or indirectly through the National Govern-
ment (and thus on the Council). Finally the weight and willingness of the integration 
winners to compromise (i.e. readiness to pay in the framework of compensation strate-
gies) has to be put against that. 
 On the side of the old members a refusal of accession of new candidates is rather im-
probable. The negatively affected member states will probably be compensated by in-
terim regulations, as there is an indication in the fact that in the December 2000 Nice 
summit, they gave in to the Spaniards’ insisting on consensus in the regional policy by 
2007. But the refusal of the contract of Nice by Ireland portends that in the end there is 
no absolute security. There will probably be in no old member state country a referen-
dum on the enlargement, as it took place only once in France in 1972 before the first EU 
enlargement. We already referred above to the possible reservations of Austria and 
Greece. 
 It is different with the candidate countries. In many countries there are foreseen 
referendums. In opinion polls the rates of consent oscillate, which as a rule have been 
clearly decreasing since 1996. True, there are only a few political parties, who plainly 
declare themselves against a EU-membership, but they do exist and occasionally (for 
example in 2001 in Poland) they achieved surprising successes. So far, most of the ar-
ticulated interests in that context are rather vague (fear from excessive proportion of 
foreigners etc.). If they should manifest themselves more in form of concrete compen-
sation and interim regulations, which put the national and EU policy before concrete de-
cisions, then the supporters of an enlargement would have to develop more political 
imagination than they did so far with simple insisting on the acquis. 
 Then, in the enlarged Union more differentiating will be probably necessary on one 
hand and stronger equalization policies on EU level on the other hand. In any case, it 
has to be assumed, in view of the here-above described constellation of interests, that 
such a trend – if it does not occur in the course of the accession process – will prevail 
after the enlargement under the pressure of the then considerably more influential new 
members. From their point of view the swallowing of the bitter pill of the acquis may be 
the price to finally enter the Club and thus participate in determining the standards. The 
double standards described in the beginning, which the EU uses for the members and 
candidates (for example in the minority policy) have probably taught the candidates an 
important lesson. 
Translated from German 
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